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Abstract
This paper is concerned with the process of human reading as
a high-level perceptual task. Drawing on insights from
Artificial Intelligence research -- specifically research in
natural language processing and continuous speech understanding
-- the paper attempts to present a fairly concrete picture of the
kinds of hypothesis formation and inference processes that must
take place during the reading process. It makes the case that
many more alternative hypotheses are formed and evaluated than
one might expect and that the majority of such processing happens
below the level of conscious introspection. Two text passages of
different levels of difficulty are considered in detail, and the
applicability of such Artificial Intelligence insights to the
modeling of human reading are discussed.
Multiple Theory Formation
1. Overview
High-level perceptual tasks such as reading, speech
understanding, and visual scene interpretation are characterized
by the need to discover a structured interpretation that accounts
for the stimuli present. This process is prerequisite to
deciding what has been perceived, and thus precedes whatever
process decides what to do with the resulting perception -- what
significance to attach to it, whether to remember it, how to
incorporate it into the knowledge base of the perceiver, etc. In
this paper, I will attempt to make the case that the process of
arriving at an interpretation of the input involves the formation
and evaluation of many alternative partial hypotheses about the
input and that this process goes on largely below the level of
introspective awareness of the perceiver. Even though skilled
reading involves a variety of "metacognitive" strategies [Brown,
1978], in normal reading these processes are themselves invoked
without conscious attention to the process of doing so.
I will focus on the problem of reading, and will draw on
insights and analogies from work in Natural Language Parsing and
Continuous Speech Understanding. Since I do not have space here
to give an adequate introduction to all of the background
material that I would like to use, I will instead refer the
reader to three previous papers: "Meaning and Machines" [Woods,
1973b], "Syntax, Semantics, and Speech" [Woods, 1975a] and
"What's in a Link: Foundations for Semantic Networks" [Woods,
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1975b]. The most recent material on speech understanding is
unfortunately only contained in technical reports. I recommend
in particular the BBN final report [Woods et al., 1976], Vols. I,
III, IV, and V. For a brief overview of the BBN speech
understanding system, see Wolf and Woods [1977].
2. Multiple Hypotheses, Backtracking, and Nondeterminism
Many of our intuitions about techniques for dealing with
multiple hypotheses come from work in parsing algorithms for
formal. grammars. This is an area where both theoretical results
in automata theory and empirical results from programmed parsers
are available. Other areas where such insights can be gained are
formal theorem proving, machine vision, and continuous speech
understanding. Perhaps the earliest and most widely known
mechanism for handling multiple hypotheses is the predictive
analyzer, or pushdown store parser [Kuno & Oettinger, 1963],
using backtracking to handle the possibility of multiple
alternatives.
A pushdown store parser is essentially an algorithm for
analyzing a sentence in terms of rules such as "a sentence
consists of a noun phrase followed by a verb phrase". It
operates by using a stack or "pushdown store" of words and
phrases that are expected to occur in the sentence and at each
step compares the next input word against the top item on the
stack, either finding a match between the current word and the
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predicted category, finding that the current word is incompatible
with the predicted category, or expanding a predicted phrase type
to a sequence of words and phrases that would realize it (in
which case the new predicted categories replace the one from
which they are derived on the stack). The stack operates very
much like the spring loaded stacks of dishes and trays that one
finds in some cafeterias (from which it derives its name).
Backtracking refers to the process of saving enough information
before making a choice among alternatives (in this case before
choosing a particular rule to expand a phrase type) so that at a
later time the situation prior to the choice can be reconstructed
and a different choice selected.
For example, if a backtracking parser encounters a word that
can be either a noun or a verb in a context where both nouns and
verbs would be acceptable (albeit with different interpretations)
then enough information is saved to remember the current position
in the sentence and all of the decisions made so far before
making one of the choices, say treating the word as a noun.
Subsequently if this choice does not lead to an acceptable
complete parsing (or in any case if all possible parsings are
required), the saved information is restored and the other choice
is tried.
Backtracking is not the only way of implementing an
algorithm for exploring multiple alternatives, however. Other
methods involve the creation of separate virtual processes for
Multiple Theory Formation
each of the alternative choices, which can then be run in
parallel or in some prioritized order. (A virtual process
behaves conceptually as if it were an ongoing process, but may in
fact be competing for time and resources with other such
processes so that the number of processes actually receiving
resources at any given moment may be fewer than the number of
"virtual" processes that are conceptually "active".)
A general method for specifying and discussing algorithms
for this kind of processing of multiple alternatives is to treat
the algorithms as procedures one of whose basic instruction types
has the meaning "choose one of the following alternatives: ... ".
Such procedures are "executed" by an interpreter that
systematically considers all possible combinations of such
choices, either by backtracking or by the method of separate
virtual processes. Such algorithms are referred to as
nondeterministic algorithms, not because their eventual behavior
is not determined, but because the specification of the exact
order in which the various alternatives will be considered and
the mechanism by which the combinations of choices will be
enumerated are not overtly specified as part of the algorithm.
Parsing natural language is fundamentally a nondeterministic
process. That is, it is not possible to make all of the correct
decisions based solely on local information. Rather, tentative
decisions must be made and explored to see if their consequences
are plausible. For example, the decision as to whether a given
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word is being used as a noun or a verb depends on whether a
complete parsing can be found under one or the other of the two
assumptions. Thus "Fly" in "Fly fishing is fun" is a noun (used
as a modifier), while in "Fly fishing equipment to Lakeview Lodge
as soon as possible" it is a verb. (If you required a few
seconds to find the correct interpretation of this sentence due
to an initial incorrect interpretation of "Fly fishing," then you
have experienced what is known as the "garden path" phenomenon.)
Occasionally, several choices will lead to a complete parsing, in
which case the sentence is ambiguous (as in "The girl guides
fish", which could either be a statement about what girl guides
do in their spare time or a description of a shepherdess for
fish).
Predictive parsing is an intuitively satisfying analogy for
thinking about human sentence processing since it seems to
correspond well to our introspective awareness of stages of the
parsing process. Notably, if the sentence is stopped at some
point we can generate a completion; in general, we know what
kinds of words to expect next at each point; and occasionally we
are aware of having made a false early decision and having to
back up to look for another alternative (in garden path sentences
like the one above). One soon gets into difficulty with this
analogy, however, since systematic predictive analysis for a
natural language grammar makes many more extraneous tentative
excursions down false parsing paths than people seem to. Also,
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the time required by people to recover from a garden path seems
to be much shorter than that required by a backtracking parser
[Collins & Quillian, 1971]. In the Artificial Intelligence
field, this has given rise to a search for techniques to make the
enumeration of parse paths more selective (e.g., by using
"semantic" information) in order to correspond more closely to
the level of backtracking that we are aware of when we read. In
other quarters, it has given rise to the labeling of such
processes as "Gestalt", treating the process a black box whose
internal workings one does not attempt to understand.
In this paper I will attempt to make the case for another
account, namely that the amount of partial hypothesis formation
that a person actually performs in such tasks is far more than it
seems, and that the bulk of it occurs below the level of
introspective awareness. I will draw largely on experience in
constructing speech understanding systems. In the speech
understanding task, it is relatively easy to make the case that
there is a great deal of hypothesis formation and testing
required even to know what words have been heard, much less how
they are to be parsed and interpreted. However, most of this
processing takes place exceedingly fast and without conscious
effort. Once it is realized that the human perceptual processes
are capable of making large numbers of alternative hypotheses and
choosing among them on the basis of relatively high-level
plausibility judgments - all without conscious effort or
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awareness - it is not difficult to imagine such capabilities
being used in reading and other high-level perceptual tasks.
3. Characteristics of the Speech Understanding Process
A naive view of speech understanding might consider it as a
process of successively recognizing speech sounds (called
phonemes), grouping phonemes into words, parsing word sequences
into sentences, and finally interpreting the meanings of those
sentences. However, considerable experience now indicates that
the acoustic evidence present in the original speech signal is
not sufficient to support such a process [Woods and Makhoul,
1974]. For sentences recorded from continuous speech, it is not
generally possible to reliably determine the phonetic identity of
the individual phonemes (or even to be sure how many phonemes are
present) using the acoustic evidence alone. Experiments in
spectrogram reading [Klatt and Stevens, 1971] indicate that the
reliability of such determinations can be increased by use of the
redundancy provided by knowledge of the vocabulary, the syntax of
the language, and semantic and pragmatic considerations.
Tape splicing experiments [Wanner, 1973] seem to indicate
that this low-level acoustic ambiguity is an inherent
characteristic of speech and not just a limitation of human
spectrogram-reading. Specifically, intelligibility of individual
words excised from continuous speech is very low, but the
intelligibility increases when sequences of two or three words
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are excised. It appears that the additional constraint of having
to make sense in a larger context begins to resolve the
ambiguities that were present when only the acoustic evidence was
considered. This processing, however, happens below the level of
introspection and has all of the subjective characteristics of a
wholistic or Gestalt phenomenon. That is, if a sufficiently long
sequence of continuous speech is heard, its correct
interpretation usually appears immediately and effortlessly,
without conscious awareness of the details of the process. The
vast majority of our spoken communications are understood in this
manner, and it is markedly contrasted with those cases where an
utterance is garbled sufficiently to invoke conscious effort to
decide what was said.
4. Theories, Monitors, Notices, and Events -
A Computational Framework for Perception
The BBN speech understanding system [Woods et al., 1976;
Wolf and Woods, 1977] has evolved within a general framework for
viewing perceptual processes. Central to this framework is an
entity called a theory. A theory represents a particular
hypothesis about some or all of the sensory stimuli that are
present. Perception is viewed as the process of forming a
believable coherent theory which can account for all the stimuli.
This is arrived at by successive refinement and extension of
partial theories until a best complete theory is found.
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In general, a high-level perception process requires the
ability to recognize any member of a potentially infinite class
of perceptible objects that are constructed out of elementary
constituents according to known rules. That is, the object
perceived is generally a compound object, constructed from
members of a finite set of elementary constituents according to
some kind of well-formedness rules. These elementary
constituents, as well as the relationships among them that are
invoked in the well-formedness rules, must be directly
perceptible. Thus, a perceptual system must incorporate some
basic epistemological assumptions about the kinds of things that
it can perceive and the rules governing their assembly. The
well-formedness rules can be used to reject impossible
interpretations of the input stimuli, and may also be useable to
predict other constituents that could be present if a given
partial theory is correct.
This perception framework assumes mechanisms for using
subsets of the input stimuli to form initial "seed" hypotheses
for certain elementary constituents (stimulus-driven
hypothesization) and mechanisms for deriving hypotheses for
additional compatible constituents from a partial theory
(theory-driven, or predicted, hypothesization*). It also assumes
mechanisms for verifying a hypothesis against the input stimuli
and evaluating the well-formedness of a compound hypothesis to
assign it some measure of quality and/or likelihood. A theory
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may therefore be thought of as a hypothesis that has been
evaluated in this way and assigned a measure of confidence.*
In the case of speech understanding, a theory can range from
an elementary hypothesis that a particular word is present at a
particular point in the input (a word match) to a complete
hypothesis of a covering sequence of words with a complete
syntactic and semantic interpretation. (In general, a theory can
be a set of compatible word hypotheses with gaps between them and
with partial syntactic and semantic interpretations.) A partial
theory may be able to generate predictions for appropriate words
or classes of words either adjacent to the words already
hypothesized, or possibly elsewhere in the utterance.
Predictions are dealt with in our computational framework by
two kinds of devices: monitors, which are passively waiting for
expected constituents, and proposals, which are elementary
hypotheses that are to be evaluated against the input. Proposals
result in actively seeking stimuli that would verify them, while
monitors passively wait for such hypotheses to be formed. The
functioning of monitors assumes that there is an organizing
*Our notion of stimulus-driven hypothesization is essentially the
same as that of "bottom-up" processing referred to in many
discussions of such processes. However, our notion of
theory-driven hypothesization is slightly different from the
sense usually given to "top-down" processing in that it does not
necessarily imply any global ("topmost") hypothesis, but only
predictability by some other hypothesis, which may itself have
been derived "bottom-up". The terms "top-down" and "bottom-up"
in this sense come from the literature on formal parsing
algorithms.
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structure into which all derived partial hypotheses are placed as
they are discovered and that the monitors can essentially set
"traps" in this structure for the kinds of events that they are
watching for. This is to be contrasted with continuous parallel
evaluation of special processes (frequently called "demons") to
watch for expected patterns in the input stream. Monitors
perform no computation until and unless some other process makes
an entry of the kind they are waiting for in some data structure.
The functioning of monitors is illustrated by an early
speech understanding system dealing with concentrations of
chemical elements in lunar rocks. There, for example, a word
match for "concentration" would set monitors on the concept nodes
for SAMPLE and CHEMICAL ELEMENT in the semantic network. If a
word such as "Helium" was subsequently found anywhere else in the
utterance, a check in the semantic network starting with Helium
would lead to the superset category CHEMICAL ELEMENT where it
would wake up the monitor from "concentration", thus detecting
the coincidence of a detected hypothesis and a predicted
hypothesis [Nash-Webber, 1975].
When a monitor is triggered, an event is created calling for
the evaluation of a new hypothesis and the creation of a new
theory if the hypothesis is not rejected. In general, a number
of events are competing for service by the processor at any
moment. In human perception, there may be full parallel
processing of such events, but in a serial machine, these events
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must be queued and given processing resources on the basis of
some priority ordering. (Even in human perception, there is
probably some sort of priority allocation of resources, since
various kinds of interference can occur.) In our computational
framework, events are maintained on a queue in order of priority,
the top event being processed at each step.
The processing of an event can result in new proposals being
made, new monitors being set, and existing monitors being
triggered to produce new events. Since so much hinges on the
event chosen for processing, a major issue is that of assigning
priorities to events in order to find the most likely
interpretation of the input. In the BBN system, priority scores
are assigned on the basis of Bayesian estimates of the
probabilities of the competing theories, and certain control
strategies and priority scoring metrics can be guaranteed to
discover the most probable interpretation of the input.
5. Control Strategies
The above discussion leaves open issues such as when should
seeds be formed, how many should be considered, should all seeds
be worked on in parallel, etc. These issues we refer to as
control issues. They have been critically important in
computerized speech understanding systems. In the BBN system,
for example, there are a variety of different control strategies
that all fit within the above paradigm. Figure 1 illustrates one
- 13 -
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# SCORE REGION THEORY
1 0 11-14 ADD
2 0 4-7 NEED
3 -.455 0-3 SHOW !
4 -.605 12-17 TRIP
5 -.727 1-5 ROME
6 -.769 8-11 THERE
7 -1.25 12-18 TRIP-S
8 -1.47 0-5 SHELLY
9 -1.65 15-17 END
10 -1.72 11-14 AND
11 -1.73 1-5 ANN
12 -1.74 0-5 CHEYENNE
13 -2.19 8-14 BERT
14 -2.26 2-6 ANY
15 -2.82 0-5 SOME
+15 ADDITIONAL EVENTS
Fig. 1. Seed events for middle-out strategy.
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class of strategies in which seeds are formed anywhere in the
utterance that sufficiently salient word matches are found. The
figure shows the seed events formed as a result of an initial
scan of an utterance for high likelihood word matches anywhere in
the utterance. Each theory is assigned a score expressing its
likelihood of being correct (actually a logarithm of the ratio of
the likelihood of the acoustic evidence given the theory over the
a priori likelihood of that evidence occurring independently).
The region of the utterance covered by the theory is indicated by
specifying its left and right boundary positions in a list of
potential boundary positions (the left end of the utterance is
numbered 0 and in this case the right end is numbered 18). The
exclamation marks indicate the theories that are actually part of
the correct interpretation.
For this general class of control strategies, referred to as
"middle-out", theories are grown by starting with a seed word,
asking a higher-level linguistic component to predict categories
of words that can occur on either side of it, asking a lexical
retrieval component to find the best matching words in those
categories on the appropriate sides, and generating events for
each such word found to extend the theory by adding that word.
Thus, events will be placed on the event queue to add words both
on the left and on the right ends of given theories. These "new
word" events will compete with each other and with the remaining
seed events on the basis of score to determine which event will
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be processed next, causing the processor to sometimes continue
adding words to a given theory and at other times to shift its
processing to a different competing theory.
Figure 2 shows the sequence of theories that are formed as a
result of this process, starting with the event queue of Figure
1. (Brackets in the figure indicate theories that include the
hypothesis that the left or right ends of the utterance have been
reached. A number in parentheses after a theory number is the
number of a preceding theory from which the indicated theory was
formed by the addition of a new word.) Notice that the final
theory is developed in this case by working independently on two
different portions of the utterance starting from the seeds
"show" and "trips". The final theory in figure 2 is in fact
derived from a kind of event called a collision event which
combines the theories "show me" and "trips" when they both notice
the word "her" filling the gap between them. This event is
formed during the processing of theory 13, although its score is
such that it does not reach the top of the queue until theory 23.
Figure 3 shows the seed theories for a hybrid strategy in
which seeds are started within a bounded distance from the left
end of the utterance, and are grown right-to-left until they
reach the left end, after which the remainder of the processing
is left-to-right. Figure 4 shows the sequence of theories
developed in the course of understanding this utterance using the
hybrid strategy . The basically left-to-right nature of the
- 16 -
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THEORY#1
THEORY#2
THEORY#3
THEORY# 4 (3)
THEORY#5(4)
THEORY#6(3)
THEORY#7
THEORY#8
THEORY#9(4)
THEORY#10(3)
THEORY#11(7)
THEORY#12
THEORY#13(12)
THEORY#14(13)
THEORY#15(12)
THEORY#16
THEORY#17(16)
THEORY#18
THEORY#19
THEORY#20(11)
THEORY#21(20)
THEORY#22(20)
THEORY#23(9,13)
ADD
NEED
SHOW !
[SHOW !
[SHOW ALL
SHOW ALL
TRIP
ROME
[SHOW ME !
SHOW ME !
HER
HER
HER
TRIP
TRIP-S !
TRIP-S] !
TRIP-S] !
TRIP-S!
SHELLY
[SHELLY
[SHOW ME HER TRIP
SHOW ME HER TRIP
HER TRIP IS
HER TRIP IS]
OF HER TRIP IS
[SHOW ME HER TRIP-S] !
Fig. 2. Theories formed for middle-out strategy.
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# SCORE REGION
1-5
3-6
0-1
2-3
5-10
5-9
1-3
1-4
1-5
3-6
3-7
1-4
1-5
1-6
3-6
+39 ADDITIONAL EVENTS
Fig. 3. Seed events for hybrid strategy.
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WHO
WE
-PAUSE- !
A
ELEVEN
IRAQ
HER
WHOLE
DO !
WERE
WORK
HIS
HOW
HAWAII
WHERE
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
3.53
1.92
0.0
-2.43
-3.24
-4.32
-5.36
-6.00
-6.18
-6.21
-6.53
-6.85
-7.00
-7.12
-7.21
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THEORY#1
THEORY#2(1)
THEORY#3
THEORY#4(3)
THEORY#5(4)
THEORY#6(3)
THEORY#7(5)
THEORY#8(7)
THEORY#9
THEORY#10(9)
THEORY#11(3)
THEORY#12(8)
THEORY#13(12)
WHO
[WHO
WE
DO WE
[DO WE !
[WE !
[DO WE HAVE !
[DO WE HAVE A !
-PAUSE- !
[-PAUSE- !
ARE WE
[DO WE HAVE A SURPLUS !
[DO WE HAVE A SURPLUS] !
Fig. 4. Theories formed for hybrid strategy.
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hybrid strategy, except for a bounded initial delay in getting
started, seems to be a reasonable possibility for a model of
human speech understanding, since it is clear that human
processing of speech does not involve the buffering of a complete
sentence before understanding begins. The reading process,
however, may involve more jumping around in a text and share some
of the characteristics of the middle-out strategy.
6. Subconscious Processing of Alternatives
in Speech and Reading
Essential in all of the above strategies is that at any
given time there are a number of incomplete, competing possible
interpretations, requiring a strategy to determine when
processing resources should shift from one partial theory to
another. One might initially suspect that a listener would be
consciously aware of such competing possible theories and that
shifting from one to another would correspond to the noticeable
phenomena experienced with garden path sentences. However, our
experience with speech understanding systems indicates that the
construction and evaluation of competing partial hypotheses is
far more prevalent than our introspective awareness makes
apparent. It seems, then, that there must be some process for
handling multiple alternative hypotheses that is subconscious and
highly efficient (for perhaps a limited class of phenomena) and
there is some other process that makes alternatives visible to
our perception (perhaps for a more difficult class or phenomena
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or for those that have not been frequent enough to have been
"compiled" into our subconscious process).
This distinction between conscious and subconscious
processing is of course not an original observation. For
example, Becker [1972] has referred to the former, subconscious
processes as intermediate level cognition. It is likely that the
bulk of our intelligent processing consists of this kind of
subconscious intermediate level processing, and that the
"thinking" which we are aware of at the conscious level is merely
the tip of the iceberg. Conscious processing seems to be largely
sequential and relatively slow, while the subconscious processes
must (by virtue of the information processing tasks that they
accomplish) be either highly parallel or exceptionally fast (or
both). Other examples of the kinds of subconscious processes to
which I refer are the retrieval of an association given a
stimulus and the recognition of a face.
I will argue that the reading process contains large
components of this kind of subconscious processing. In general,
a reader is aware only of the final interpretation which he
places on a sentence in a text; he is not aware of all of the
intermediate stages of the derivation of that interpretation, all
of the local ambiguities that were resolved by later context, and
the accessing of factual memory to evaluate plausibility of
competing partial interpretations. Nevertheless, a close
examination of the information processing required to arrive at
- 21 -
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the final interpretation indicates that large amounts of such
processing must be going on. By way of example, consider the
resolution of the antecedent of the pronoun "they" in the
following pair of sentences adapted from Winograd [1971]:
a) The city council refused to grant the women a parade permit
because they feared violence.
b) The city council refused to grant the women a parade permit
because they advocated violence.
This resolution appears to happen effortlessly, but the
criteria that are needed to make the selection indicate that a
very sophisticated inferential process is acting here below the
level of awareness. It is not sufficient to choose the preferred
interpretations ("council feared violence" in the first case and
"women advocated violence" in the second) on the basis of some
simple strength of association, between "council" and "fear" or
between "women" and "advocate". If anything, one's a priori
expectations for such associations would go the other way. It
would appear that on a priori grounds, women fearing violence
would be at least as plausible as city councils fearing violence.
It is only at the level where one begins to evaluate what would
be plausible grounds for a city council to make a refusal that
the preference emerges. This implies a process in which very
high-level evaluations of alternative interpretations of the
sentence are required before fairly low level ambiguities are
resolved. It does not seem possible to even formulate the
necessary question to resolve the ambiguity until both possible
- 22 -
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interpretations have been formulated and elaborated at least to
the level of justification of grounds for refusal. It is clearly
not the case that a process must be simple and easy just because
it happens in the head very rapidly and without apparent effort.
In subsequent sections we will consider many more examples of
this kind of inference in reading.
7. Implications for Psychological Models of Reading
The above picture of the perception process as involving
many competing partial hypotheses that are formed and evaluated
below the level of introspection has significant implications for
the design of experiments to investigate the reading process.
For example, it is possible that a large percentage of the
reaction time for understanding many sentences is due to the
evaluation of competing alternatives and not due at all to
aspects of the correct interpretation. Thus, two different
sentences or texts having some identified difference in the
structure of their correct interpretation(s) that one would like
to investigate may also have differences in reaction time due to
extraneous differences in the number or complexity of competing
partial hypotheses that are not part of the final interpretation.
To make ,matters worse, the effect of such competition
depends critically on whether the process for handling
alternatives is a serial or parallel process. As a simple
example, consider a parallel processing control strategy which at
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each step extends the n most likely theories in the event queue
for some number n (perhaps large). Then up to n different
theories may be pursued as alternatives without introducing
reaction time delay, but alternatives in excess of n would
introduce delays.
The speech understanding models also predict that a favored
competitor may be found much sooner than an unfavored competitor,
and that the reaction time for a given interpretation may be
longer if the correct interpretation is delayed by a partial
theory that looks better locally but does not extend as well.
In the human brain, the implementation of such capabilities
may not correspond to that of a queue sorted by priority. Other
"implementations" could involve a large number of active memory
elements that interact among themselves in such a way that the
highest priority member is selected for processing, or resources
could be allocated to all pending events in proportion to their
priorities, etc. Thus, timing predictions cannot be made
directly from the performance of computerized systems running on
serial machines, but have to be made from an extrapolation of
such behavior to hypothesized mechanisms in the brain.
Unfortunately the number of degrees of freedom in such
extrapolation is large, so working out a psychologically
verifiable model of the process is likely to be lengthy with many
intermediate models that have to be formulated and then rejected.
- 24 -
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8. A Close Look at Some Reading Material
Having now given, I hope, sufficient reason to believe that
both in speech understanding and in reading there are significant
inferential processes that occur below the level of
introspection, and that the characteristics of these processes
are quite different from those of conscious inferential processes
(especially with respect to apparent degree of perceived
difficulty versus the amount of information processing actually
done), I would like now to look in some detail at the reading
process.
I will present fragments from two passages with
significantly different levels of reading difficulty, accompanied
by a detailed analysis of some of the inferential problems that
must be solved for their full understanding. Each fragment comes
from a passage of 4-6 paragraphs that is relatively self
contained, but has apparently been extracted from some larger
work. The passages are from the Riverside Research Institute
Reading Competency Test [Riverside Research Institute, 1974].
8.a. Taffy
Taffy is a puppy. She is small. She is soft.
She is sweet. What if Taffy belonged to you? Would
you know what to do? Read this story. You will find
out how to take care of Taffy.
Taffy sleeps a lot. She needs a place to rest.
Take a large box and cut out one side. Put in
something soft to lie on. This will be Taffy's bed.
Put it in a warm place. Keep it dry and clean.
- 25 -
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The apparent purpose of this story is to let a child know
what having a puppy is like. This includes preparing the child
to empathize with the puppy and take care of it. The story
assumes knowledge of what a puppy is. It adds to the concept, if
not already present, the attributes of smallness, softness, and
sweetness. (Notice that the child must conclude that sweet is
not a taste but a personality attribute.) Prominent in the story
are rhetorical questions, designed to make the child think, to
extrapolate from the given attributes. The story sets up the
impression of holding a small, soft puppy. Then it asks
rhetorically whether child would know what to do with a puppy.
The intention is apparently to set the child up in the imaginary
situation of having a puppy and not knowing what to do with it.
The story then suggests a resolution of the dilemma -- namely,
read the story. The result will be that child will know how to
take care of a puppy.
Although the entire story is written in terms of a
particular puppy, Taffy, it is clear that what the reader is to
get from it is to apply to all puppies. How is this
distinguished from, say, a story about Lassie, in which the story
is intended to give attributes of a particular dog rather than
dogs in general?
The rest of the story, of which the above is only a brief
excerpt, is a conditional program for taking care of a puppy. It
involves following directions. The story might be read for
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general information, in which case the goal of the story is for
the child to remember at some later time something about taking
care of puppies. It could also be read with an immediate need at
hand and followed like a cookbook. The following is a
sentence-by-sentence account of some of the characteristics of
this story.
1. [Taffy is a puppy.]
This sentence occurs with no prior context. In
isolation, it would be an informing statement and would
presume that the reader knew some referent for Taffy, but
not that it was a puppy. As part of a story, perhaps it
can be interpreted as introducing a character. Certainly,
the intended result of the sentence in understanding the
story is the creation of a temporary entity of type puppy,
named Taffy, about which the reader expects to hear more in
the course of the story.
2. [She is small.]
This sentence adds an attribute to the introduced
character (character development). The anaphoric reference
("she") here is easy, but in general would be more
difficult if there were more than one potential antecedent.
In this case, since Taffy is at best slightly correlated
with feminine gender, the feminine pronoun is more likely
to be interpreted as adding information to the model,
rather than a restriction on the antecedent. This is an
example of a situation where what would be a prerequisite
in one context is adding information in another.
3,4. [She is soft. She is sweet.]
Same as above.
5. [What if Taffy belonged to you?]
This is a rhetorical question that exhorts the reader
to add a representation of himself to the situation and
draw some forward inferences. (ulterior motive -- arouse
feelings)
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6. [Would you know what to do?]
Another rhetorical question. This invites the reader
to ask this question of himself. (ulterior motive
reader concludes he wouldn't know what to do or at least
would like some guidance or refreshment)
7. [Read this story.]
An imperative. Notice that this sentence has a self
reference - the antecedent of "this story" is not present
in the discourse, but refers to the story itself. The
reader must be able to identify the reference. Note that a
literal interpretation (e.g., by a computer) might be to
begin again at the beginning to read the story, which would
result ultimately in an infinite loop. The child is
presumed to be sensible enough to know that he has already
read part of it and can fulfill the command by merely
reading the rest of the story. Alternatively, he can
assume the phrase "this story" is a forward pointing
reference to what remains, and that the part that has just
been read is somehow a preamble or something, but not
properly part of the story. The child could conceivably
take either of these alternatives.
8. [You will find out how to take care of Taffy.]
A declarative sentence, but presumably interpreted as
the consequent of a conditional -- "you will find out ...
if you read the story". Not only that, but it says that
you will learn how to take care of Taffy, when in fact,
what you will learn how to do is take care of any puppy.
In the entire story, Taffy is clearly the name of a
variable that can later be instantiated. Does the child
fully understand this? Does anything in the subsequent
story depend on Taffy being female? How does the child
determine at what level to generalize what he learns.
E.g., to all puppies? to female puppies? to small, soft,
female puppies? or perhaps to small, soft, animals? On the
other hand, if he were really learning how to take care of
Taffy, a particular dog, he would have to know where she
lived, etc.
After the first paragraph, there is an expectation that a major
portion of the rest of the story (maybe all of it) will be
instructions in how to take care of a dog. We will discuss just
a few more sentences.
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9. [Taffy sleeps a lot.]
This adds more to properties of a puppy (Taffy?)
(ulterior motive -- motivates next sentence and rest of
paragraph)
10. [She needs a place to rest.]
An implicit "therefore" relates this sentence to the
previous one. (ulterior motive -- creates a need which
subsequent sentences will tell how to meet). Does a child
pick up the implied causality connection between this and
the previous sentence?
11. [Take a large box and cut out one side.]
This imperative is not necessarily to be done
immediately as was the one in the first paragraph. If the
reader is in recipe mode, he might do it immediately, but
even then it would be better to incorporate the instruction
into a plan that is being built up, and go on to read more
instructions before doing anything. If in the mode of
reading for future information, the reader should form the
plan, and also elaborate the reasons for the individual
steps, so that he will be more likely to remember it. The
previous sentences motivating this sentence help in this
respect, but the reader should also internally answer such
questions as "Why a box?", "Why cut out one side?", and
"What am I going to do with the box?" Also, he should
understand that this use of "take" does not mean "steal".
Likewise, he needs a decision on how large is large? This is
one reason for incorporating the instruction into a
tentative plan and then going on to elaborate the plan.
Subsequent decisions may have a bearing on how large the box
must be. For example, a refrigerator box or piano box is
not necessary.
8.b. Growth
Growth is characterized by organization. Group
growth charts show many age level uniformities and
predictable age level changes. Differences between
individuals in growth certainly exist. However, most
individuals tend to be only slightly variable in their
rate of growth from one age level to another.
This story is much more abstract and sophisticated than the
Taffy story. It is apparently intended to impart to the reader
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some general information about the growth process for some
indefinite future use. The passage could possibly be an excerpt
from a biological text book. It is characterized by a much
greater necessity for the reader to suspend judgment on possible
interpretations of portions of the passage until he has read
further. Among other things, it is characterized by a large
number of noun-noun modification constructions ("group growth
charts", "age level uniformities", etc.), where a noun is used to
modify another noun. The intended meaning of such constructions
is critically dependent on world knowledge of the habitual
relationships between the two nouns. A detailed account of some
of the difficulties of this passage follows:
1. [Growth is characterized by organization.]
This sentence introduces the topic "growth" and focuses
on its organizational aspect. It doesn't say much as a
factual assertion. If the reader asks himself a great deal
about this question out of context, he may try to instantiate
examples of kinds of growth and try to find instances of
organization associated with them. In all likelihood,
however, he will do little with this sentence, but go on to
see what's coming next.
2. [Group growth charts show many age level uniformities and
predictable age level changes.]
This is a difficult sentence syntactically. It has
three noun-noun modifier constructions which require
inference to determine their meaning. If the phrase "group
growth charts" means something to the reader as a technical
term in some field, then the sentence is considerably easier,
but otherwise, he is left wondering "groups of what?"
(possibly people, but the story doesn't say). The most
general possible assumption is growth of organisms (or
perhaps even more general still - including institutions,
cultures, empires, etc. - all of this is consistent with the
very abstract first statement, and it is possible that the
vagueness and abstractness of the first sentence is intended
to make such general interpretations of the second possible.)
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The phrases "age level uniformities" and "age level
changes" are again considerably more easy to understand if
they are previously known technical phrases than if they have
to be figured out from scratch. In the latter case, the
reader needs to decide whether the phrases use the word "age"
to modify the phrases "level uniformities" and "level
changes" or whether the phrase "age level" modifies
"uniformities" and "changes." In this case, we assume that
the reader is familiar with the concept of "age level" and
would for that reason choose the latter interpretation, since
he is not likely to find a plausible reference for the phrase
"level uniformities". (Note that "level changes" is a
perfectly good phrase, but would require a subquestion
"what kinds of levels"). The sentences would be more
properly punctuated as "age-level uniformities" and
"age-level changes", but such punctuation is frequently
missing and a good reader is expected to be able to
understand the phrases anyway. The difficulty is greater
without the hyphens, since it opens up the possibility of
different interpretations and requires the reader to resolve
the ambiguity using semantic and pragmatic considerations.
3. [Differences between individuals in growth certainly exist.]
It's hard to say what this sentence does, except to set
up expectations for what will come next. The choice of the
word "individuals" suggests a restriction of the notion of
growth being talked about to single organisms and perhaps to
people, rather than the more sweeping generalizations to
organizations and cultures that were possible for sentences 1
and 2. For a reader who jumped to the conclusion that growth
of people was being talked about at the outset, this story
may actually be easier than for the more intellectual reader
who made the more general extrapolation and is now faced with
the necessity to reconcile this use of the word "individuals"
with his previous generalization.
It might be possible that this sentence just referred to
certain kinds of growth (i.e., of individuals), while the
story as a whole would still he about the more general
concept of growth. However, some pragmatic rule seems to say
that if that were the case, then the story would have
contained some transition indicating a temporary shift to
considering growth of individuals. Such a sentence might
have been "In individuals, differences in growth exist" (with
a presupposition that what is being said is not true for
growth in other than individuals). In the absence of such a
focus-shifting locution, the good reader should assume that
this sentence is still about the same topic at the same
level, and therefore his initial uncertainty about the
generality of the concept of growth being discussed should
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here be resolved to refer to the growth of individuals
(probably human).
Some processing load, which may have been considerable,
was required to keep this decision open to this point, and
some is still required until the reader determines whether
the individuals of concern are people or individual
organisms. The resource expenditure required to keep such
decisions pending may be considerable, and may significantly
affect reading difficulty or the performance of resource
limited individuals in reading such passages.
4. [However, most individuals tend to be only slightly variable
in their rate of growth from one age level to another.]
The "however" here has the effect of negating or
diminishing the strength of the preceding sentence. The
general pragmatic rule seems to be that "however" will
introduce a sentence (or paragraph) that contradicts some
expectation that the reader might otherwise have drawn from
the preceding sentence (or paragraph). It takes considerable
inference to determine which specific expectation from the
previous sentence is here being contradicted. One
possibility is that the author is trying to contradict the
inference that the differences referred to in the preceding
sentence are large*. (This would explain the use of
"certainly" in the preceding sentence, although I am not sure
what the rule is, or whether the use of "certainly" leads the
reader to expect something of this sort to follow).
The use of "most" implies that not all individuals
satisfy the assertion. The use of "tend" is another hedge
word that says the statement is not always true. The
statement so qualified, that is, the predicate which tends to
be true of most individuals, is that their growth rate is
relatively stable from year to year. Thus, "however" is now
explained not as contradicting the possible inference that
the differences are large, but instead it contradicts the
possible inference that differences in one dimension (from
*Note that I am not necessarily assuming that the reader
consciously invokes models of the author and his intentions in
understandingsuch sentences; the rules can be formulated in such
a way that no author or ulterior motives need to be explicitly
mentioned. However, it is probable that a reader who does have a
specific model of authors and their intents is better able to
understand such passages by invoking such a model, as discussed
by Bruce [1978]. It is likely that the necessary rules can be
more succinctly represented and learned by using the concept of
an author and his intentions than by learning them by rote.
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individual to individual) might indicate differences in
another dimension (from year to year). To fully understand
these two sentences and their uses of "certainly" and
"however", the reader must have a concept of this kind of
comparison.
Whether it is necessary for the reader to actually set
up a model of something potentially varying over several
dimensions in some space, and mapping age differences and
individuation onto two such dimensions, I am not sure.
However, it is clear that a reader must either ignore the
cues given by the use of "certainly" and "however", in which
case he risks misinterpreting some part of the story, or else
he must have a sufficiently rich analysis of the sentences
and their possible interpretations that he can fully account
for them. A reader who is in between these extremes, who is
trying to account for the use of the words, but is not adept
at constructing possible underlying models to account for
them, will find this passage more difficult than either of
the other two kinds of readers. It would be a considerable
challenge to devise a test that would distinguish these three
different levels of reading. One complicating factor is that
which of the three levels of competence a reader has mastered
would probably vary considerably from one set of syntactic
cues to another.
Notice that the purpose of this story seems to be to build
up a fairly abstract model of how growth occurs. The reader is
not asked to do anything immediately except somehow to assimilate
the story. The purpose of the reader in reading the story thus
becomes of paramount importance, and if his purpose is to prepare
himself to perform in some way in the future using a model of how
growth occurs, then he is likely to do different things in
reading the story than if his purpose is, say, to be prepared to
answer questions at the end of the passage, or to fill in missing
blanks in the story. Of course, if this passage is read by an
elementary school reader, it is likely that he does not have the
goal to prepare himself for some specific future performance,
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since it is likely that he cannot even imagine a specific use for
the information. However, the author may have such a use in mind
in writing it. In particular, the author might be writing for an
adolescent who may be concerned that his own rate of growth is
too slow or too fast, and may want to convey such a growth model
so that the reader can understand what's happening to him. It
seems likely that two students, one of whom is concerned about
his slow rate of growth, and another who is determined to become
a biologist, will get completely different things out of this
story.
9. Some Details of the Readin Process
The previous discussion has outlined some of the inferences
that that need to be made in the course of understanding these
two passages. However, it sheds little light on how those
inferences might be organized and carried out. Experience with
computerized language understanding programs and speech
understanding systems can give us some insight into how these
processes might happen, although the picture at the moment is far
from complete. In the remainder of this paper I will discuss in
more detail some of the low level decisions that have to be made
and alternative hypotheses that have to be generated and
considered, pointing out as I do so where existing techniques in
natural language processing by computers have been developed to
handle similar problems. I will consider in particular the first
two sentences of the Growth passage.
- 34 -
Multiple Theory Formation
The first sentence "Growth is characterized by
organization," is not difficult syntactically. It is a
straightforward passive sentence with little potential for
syntactic ambiguity. The first word can only be a noun, the
second is unambiguously a verb (although it is not clear after
only two words whether it is the main verb of a copular sentence
or an auxiliary verb of a passive). The fact that the third word
is a past participle resolves the sense of "is" to that of an
auxiliary in a passive sentence. [Woods, 1970] gives a detailed
account of how ATN grammars can be used to recognize and
disambiguate this main-verb/auxiliary distinction. After this,
"by" is unambiguously a preposition (although whether it is
indicating the agent of the action or introducing something which
an action takes place beside is not unambiguous). Organization
is unambiguously a noun. Hence the discovery of the syntactic
structure of this sentence is straightforward and involves little
nondeterminism. Every local syntactic ambiguity is resolved by
the immediately following word.
What the sentence means, however, is something else again.
Both noun phrases in this sentence are mass nouns (nouns that can
be used without determiners in the singular form as if they
denoted a substance, as opposed to count nouns which can be
counted). When used in the singular with no determiner, they are
to be interpreted as refering to the general concepts that they
name. ("A growth", "growths", or "an organization" would get
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completely different interpretations; the difference is flagged
by the way the words are used syntactically.)
"Growth", as was pointed out previously, can name several
different concepts that the reader might have in his head. If he
has only one such concept, then the reading task is easier
(although it may get difficult later on if the concept he has is
not the one the author intended). If he has several, then the
interpretation of the sentence is semantically ambiguous with
respect to the reference of this phrase. This can be represented
temporarily by associating with the noun phrase a list of
alternative possible interpretations (such as is done in the
semantic interpretation procedure of the LUNAR system [Woods,
1973a]).
The interpretation of "organization" appears to be somewhat
different, largely because of its absence from surface subject
position in the sentence. (Notice that "Organization
characterizes growth" would not have the same effect as the
initial sentence of this passage.) The correct interpretation of
the sentence is an assertion about growth and what is being
asserted is that it has many of the properties associated with
organization. That is, "organization" names a concept where
certain characteristics are to be found that are to be associated
now with growth.
- 36 -
Multiple Theory Formation
The differences in interpretation of the two noun phrases
are due to their position in context as different arguments of
the verb "characterize" and as different role fillers in the
surface structure of the sentence. The LUNAR system handles such
differences in interpretation as a function of context by
providing context dependent parameters to the routine that
computes possible interpretations of constituents. These
parameters are used to determine the interpretation rules to be
used for interpreting a constituent. (It is possible in general
for different possible higher interpretations to call for the
interpretation of a constituent in different ways, so provisions
are required to keep alternative interpretations of different
constituents coordinated with each other.)
For interpreting the clause as a whole, a semantic pattern
for "characterize" (or perhaps for "is characterized by") is
required. This is a fairly abstract and somewhat vague semantic
relation. My edition of Webster's gives two senses of
"characterize" -- (1) to describe the character or quality of:
DELINEATE, and (2) to be a characteristic of: DISTINGUISH.
Leaving aside the problems of the adequacy of such dictionary
definitions, I interpret these definitions to focus on two senses
of characterize -- one in which sufficient conditions are given
as in "four equal length sides and right angles characterize a
square", and the other in which merely prominent characteristics
or only some characteristics are given. Which of these two
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senses is chosen would make a big difference in what the reader
believed the passage to say. In the first case, it would say
that anything that was organized would be growth - obviously
false if one knows anything about growth and organization. The
second interpretation is that organization is a prominent
characteristic of growth. The reader must decide whether this
sentence is trying to inform him of an astounding new fact or is
merely asserting organization as a property of growth.
Presumably the second choice is more plausible than the former.
In the LUNAR system such ambiguity of word sense was
indicated by having several semantic interpretation rules
associated with a given head word, both of which might match a
given constituent being interpreted. Thus a procedure for
generating both possible interpretations is straightforward. The
problem of evaluating which of two interpretations is more
plausible is more difficult, and no computer system at the moment
makes such plausibility evaluations. Almost all current computer
models of such processes make all-or-nothing decisions that an
interpretation is either possible or impossible, with no shades
in between.
One is tempted to say that the above choice is obvious (and
implicitly therefore easy), but it is not clear exactly how far
each of the two alternative interpretations has to be elaborated
before the choice can be made. It seems to be necessary to
actually formulate the erroneous interpretation and pose it as a
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question against one's knowledge in order to determine that it is
false and therefore the other interpretation is to be preferred.
Consider here the understanding task imposed on a reader who
was not aware of both senses of the verb "characterize". If he
had only the correct interpretation, then the task would in fact
be easier than for a more advanced reader who knew them both. On
the other hand if he had only the wrong sense, then the first
sentence would be apparently false, and he would have a difficult
time with the passage. An additional possibility is that the
reader doesn't really understand what "characterize" means and
interprets this sentence merely as establishing some kind of
association between growth and organization, which as it turns
out, is about all that the sentence is intended to accomplish
anyway. The primary role of this first sentence seems to be
merely to establish growth as the topic, and perhaps bring
certain aspects of growth into focus (the organizational
aspects). Thus, the reader can get the appropriate effect
without fully understanding the sentence at all.
The second sentence, "group growth charts show many age
level uniformities and predictable age level changes", is far
more complex syntactically as well as semantically. English
syntax permits the use of nouns to modify other nouns in almost
infinite profusion, but the interpretation of the meaning depends
on non-syntactic world knowledge. Moreover when more than one
such noun modifier is used, a structural syntactic ambiguity is
introduced that requires world knowledge to resolve.
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If "group growth" occurred in isolation, the structure of a
noun, "group", modifying another noun, "growth", would be the
only possible syntactic interpretation. The determination of
what it means would depend on the ability of the reader to
identify a plausible relation between the two words (in this
case a group of things can grow, giving rise to an interpretation
"growth of a group"). However, in "group growth charts" it is
ambiguous whether "group" modifies "growth charts" or "group
growth" modifies "charts".
The fact that charts are devices for depicting things gives
"growth charts" the possible interpretation "charts depicting
growth", and "group growth charts" the possible interpretation
"charts depicting the growth of groups". However, the correct
interpretation is probably "charts depicting growth by group"
derived from "group" modifying "growth charts", requiring the
reader to either know about or imagine a kind of growth chart
that would be distinguishable by having something to do with
groups. This meaning is not very distinct from one of the
possible interpretations of "charts depicting growth of groups"
(indicating that the meaning of that structure is far from
unique), and there is certainly not enough evidence at this point
in the passage to resolve which of these different syntactic
structures or which of their semantic interpretations is to be
taken as the author's intention. The possibility of this phrase
having any of several possible interpretations needs to be held
open until more of the sentence is processed.
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The process of deciding that "charts" is the last word in
the noun phrase and that "show" is the main verb requires some
further local ambiguity, although the fact that there is no
determiner on the noun phrase requires that it end either with a
plural noun or a mass noun, so that "show" could only be included
if it were followed by another noun. ("Show" could be a noun
instead of a verb, although it would be difficult to put a
plausible interpretation on "group growth charts show" as a noun
phrase in this context.)
Exactly similar problems are encountered in interpreting
"age level uniformities" and "predictable age level changes".
The latter has even greater potential ambiguity due to the
possibilities of "predictable" modifying "age", "level", or
"changes" (e.g., "predictable changes in age level", "changes in
the predictable age level", or "changes in the level of
predictable age"). Somehow a reader makes a choice from among
these different possible interpretations, usually without much
conscious effort and usually correctly (or at least one of
several equally acceptable interpretations). In this case, none
of the above possibilities is correct, but instead, the thing
that is doing the changing is elliptical (presumably growth or
some growth ,parameter such as height or weight) and the correct
interpretation is more like "predictable changes [in some growth
parameter][as a function of] age level". Changes in a growth
parameter as a function of age are certainly to be expected and
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therefore "predictable" whereas it is difficult to imagine
anything on a growth chart that would correspond to a predictable
age level (what would be doing the predicting). Hence, a
probable role of "predictable" is to modify the concept "age
level changes" as a whole, although probably as a non-restrictive
modifier.
The above interpretation is not completely correct, since if
a similar evaluation of "age level uniformities" is carried out,
one is led to look for something that is uniform within an age
level (again, presumably some growth parameter). The fact that
conjunctions require some degree of parallelism between the two
things being conjoined appears to demand that the role of the
phrase "age level" should be the same in the two conjuncts. This
slightly contradicts the otherwise well-motivated interpretation
of "predictable age level changes" above. Instead, an
interpretation in which something changes within an age level
rather than as a function of age level is required to maintain
this parallelism. This can be met by replacing the relation "as
a function of age level" that was postulated above with "within
an age level". This, however, removes the foundation for the
argument justifying "predictable". Looking further for a
different justification, one can suppose that the charts somehow
show predictable changes (i.e., the charts do the prediction?),
and that "predictable" is a restrictive adjective here telling
something about the kinds of changes that the charts show.
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Computerized parsing algorithms using formal grammars for
extensive subsets of English can systematically enumerate all of
the possible ways of grouping the words in such noun-noun
modifiers, but the process is usually combinatorically expensive
and few computer models deal with such constructions. Attempts
to use semantic information to guide a parser to construct only
possible interpretations have been attempted, but nothing that
begins to match the complexity of the above discussion has
currently been implemented. In general, the techniques for
efficiently coupling syntactic and semantic knowledge in such
situations are still being explored and the results are not in.
The discovery of the preferred interpretation in the above
example requires the judgment that all of the various ways of
grouping the individual words in this noun-noun modifier sequence
have implausible interpretations in this context (what a group
growth chart would show) without the addition of an additional
elliptical participant in the underlying representation (namely
what changes). The chain of reasoning justifying the correct
choice is something like:
"I know that a growth chart should show changes in
some growth parameter (that's what growth is) and not
changes in growth (at least not directly -- that's the
derivative of what a growth chart would depict), so
that must fill the "changee" role of the change being
discussed. I recognize "age level" as a concept, so
that is probably the role that "age" is filling and not
a modifier of "level changes". ("level changes" is
such a concept also, but I can find a plausible
connection between "age level" and "changes" and cannot
find one, or at least not a different one, between
"age" and "level changes"). To relate "age level" to
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"changes [in a growth parameter]", I can take advantage
of further knowledge (or imagination) about growth
charts and speculate that the charts might be broken
down by "age level". That could be the role that "age
level" is filling here, but that would violate
parallelism of conjunction with the previous phrase. I
could either try to reinterpret the previous phrase to
establish parallelism or I can try the same relation
between "age level" and "changes" that I used with
"uniformities" before. The latter works, so I'll try
that. Finally, "predictable" must modify "changes"
rather than "age" or "age level", since I can imagine
charts somehow predicting changes more easily than
their predicting ages."
Making this justification, as complicated as it seems, is
relatively easy compared to the steps that were required to find
it among all the other possibilities - formulating alternatives,
making negative evaluations of some of them and differential
choices among others, and finally settling on a chosen
interpretation or several likely ones. Clearly some readers may
boggle in the face of such a passage and give up. Others may
have the processing capacity to carry through the kind of
analysis outlined here, either entirely or partially below the
level of introspection. Still others may adopt some control
strategy that does not consider all of the alternatives. Some of
them may do so with strategies that are still likely to obtain
the correct interpretation most of the time (assuming that there
is one), while others may adopt erroneous strategies that doom
them to misunderstanding. Even these latter may find
interpretations that are intellectually satisfying to themselves,
causing them to assert that they understood the passage, although
what they have understood may be almost totally unrelated to what
the passage says.
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To close our discussion of the interpretation of this second
sentence, let me point out that a lot of the reasoning that was
used for selecting an intended interpretation for "predictable
age level changes" depends on the fact that the intended
interpretation must fit the context "group growth charts show
... " in a passage whose topic is known to be growth (of
something). Effectively, many different possible interpretations
had to be hypothesized and tried in this context for a possible
fit. It appears that below the level of conscious awareness, a
great deal more hypothesis enumeration and evaluation is going on
than one would first suspect. Current computer models tend to be
based on the assumption that the amount of such hypothesis
formation can be controlled by having the right dominating
"frame" or "script", since the cost of considering many
alternative hypotheses on a serial computer is prohibitive. I
suspect, however, that this is one of the differences between the
serial computer and the human brain that is significant and that
in this respect the characteristics of computers as models of
human processing is misleading. Much of AI work will continue to
be focussed in this direction because of the desirability of
getting computers to do such tasks, but I suspect that valid
models of human performance will include much more parallel
evaluation of alternative hypotheses.
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10. Conclusion
The above discussion does not go into detail at the level of
recognition of individual words and letters, but one can model
them with similar processes, so that the overall reading process
is a cascade of levels, each of which is making only tentative
decisions. Each level will be formulating many alternative
hypotheses that are to be partially selected by virtue of the
degree to which they are compatible with hypotheses at other
levels. For example, the syntactic component in the BBN speech
understanding system makes many alternative hypotheses about
possible syntactic paths through each of the theories that it is
given by the control component to consider. Rumelhart [1977]
gives a sketch of such a multi-level model based on the
hypothesis structure of the Hearsay II speech understanding
system [Lesser et al., 1975].
I have tried to give at a fairly concrete level some picture
of the hypothesis formation and evaluation processes that must go
on during reading although we are not normally aware of them.
Many of these processes include inferences involving the kinds of
metaknowledge discussed by A. Brown [1978], although the
presentation here puts those processes in a somewhat different
light. Here, I would stress that although we have some knowledge
about what we know and how we know it, this knowledge is based on
introspective observation in much the same way that our knowledge
of any aspect of the world is based on observation. We do not in
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general have any privileged access to some "internal truth" in
this respect. We do have an awareness of certain internal mental
events that are perceivable in much the same way that our
external sense organs perceive the world, but they do not give us
a complete awareness of our internal mental processing, and we
have to learn the significance of what awareness they do give us.
This is presumably why the metacognitive abilities come rather
late in the stage of mental development.
Experiments repeatedly show that what appears to be memory
is in fact reconstruction and that many "memories" about which we
are absolutely certain turn out to be mistaken. Thus, our
metaknowledge of what we know and how we know it is only as good
as the model we have built up based on our observations of our
own performance and cannot generally be relied on as absolute
truth. Conversely, a correct understanding at the meta level of
how we should go about some mental process does not automatically
translate into an ability to carry out that process. The attempt
to consciously follow a set of instructions is not the same as
fully incorporating those instructions into one's internal
procedures. Examples of this phenomenon abound in such processes
as learning to drive, learning to sail, learning to play chess,
to solve mathematical problems, etc. The process whereby
repeated attempts to follow such instructions eventually
"compiles" an internal procedure for doing the task and the means
whereby conscious resolution to "do it different next time"
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actually modifies such procedures are almost totally mysterious.
It is the attempt at modeling such (non-introspectable)
procedures by computer programs and abstract automata that I
believe holds the key to understanding them, and it is this
understanding which is the key to effective educational
strategies.
I will not pretend that the results of Artificial
Intelligence and Natural Language Processing research to date can
give a complete account of the processes outlined above.
However, they do provide a very rich inventory of analogies out
of which one can construct hypothetical "brain computer
architectures" and reasoning strategies that might model the
information processing operations that go on in reading. The
major contribution which the AI approach has to offer, I think,
is that it reveals and makes concrete information processing
steps that one might not otherwise have suspected. It can thus
serve a very valuable function in the investigation of the
reading process. On the other hand, one has to be careful in
extrapolating results from computer models to human processes,
since certain characteristics of any computer implementation will
be determined by the nature of the computer on which they are
implemented and may not be true of the "computer" in our heads.
In certain theoretical senses, investigations of abstract
automata, such as Turing machines and abstract neural networks
can tell us what kinds of functions various subparts of the brain
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might perform and what their limitations might be. However, we
do not yet have a complete enough account of human intelligence
in such terms to derive practical results. Humans are presumably
heir to the same limitations that Turing machines are known to
have in that they cannot possess algorithms to solve formally
unsolvable problems, but beyond that we cannot begin to derive
such useful predictions as how much new information per minute
can humans learn, how many facts can they store and remember, or
any of the myriad practical questions that one would like to know
to design effective educational pedagogies.
What AI can do is serve a role very much like that which
theoretical physics or chemistry serve for their respective
fields. It can suggest models that have theoretical
characteristics that fit the known data and predict unknown data.
As such models converge and begin to be supported by empirical
study, they can be put to a wide range of practical uses, such as
designing pedagogical strategies and training material. However,
the path between where we are and the ability to make such
predictions will require a great deal of work.
Computer models up to and including the sentence level are
now relatively well articulated and can be used quite well for
analogies with human processing. Above the sentence level,
however, current capabilities of computer systems are limited,
and recognition of the intended interpretation of stories has a
number of characteristics that make it fundamentally more
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difficult than individual sentence parsing. Most current
attempts at this level rely on preselected scripts that
constrain the possible interpretations of the sentences that they
will encounter to a microscopic fraction of what could otherwise
occur. Since human beings have encyclopedic amounts of knowledge
that are drawn on and used in understanding what they read,
something much more than the current script-based theories will
be required to deal with general human behavior. However,
increasing interest in this problem by linguists, computational
linguists, philosophers, psychologists, and researchers in
artificial intelligence give promise for the development of
increasingly more adequate models of the overall reading process.
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